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Ronald Mann
Columbia Law School
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This essay compares the results from a survey administered to payday
loan borrowers at the time of their loans to subsequent borrowing and re-
payment behavior. It thus presents the first direct evidence of the accuracy
of payday loan borrowers’ understanding of how the product will be used.
The data show, among other things, that about 60% of borrowers accurately
predict how long it will take them finally to repay their payday loans. The ev-
idence directly contradicts the oft-stated view that substantially all extended
use of payday loans is the product of lender misrepresentation or borrower
self-deception about how the product will be used. It thus has direct impli-
cations for the proper scope of effective regulation of the product, a topic of
active concern for state and federal regulators.
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Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan
Borrowers
1 Introduction
Payday lending is at the heart of debates about “alternative” financial prod-
ucts. Since its rise in the early 1990’s, the product has gained widespread
traction with consumers. In the typical transaction, an individual borrows
$200-$500 and commits to repay the borrowed funds, together with a one-
time fee of 12-18% of the loan’s principal, out of the individual’s next pay-
check.1 Payday loans are now available at about 20,000 storefront locations
throughout the Nation, where more than ten million Americans borrowed
money in 2010.2 To put their success in context, there are more payday
lender locations in this country than there are Starbucks and McDonald’s
locations combined.3
Concerns about payday lending come from its role in the development
of “fringe” lending, which has played a major part in the oft-chronicled rise
of modern America’s culture of indebtedness.4 With a vehemence surprising
1See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann and Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. Rev.
855, 857 (2006)
2See The Pew Institute: Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where Do They
Borrow, and Why 2, 8 (2012) [hereinafter Pew 2012 Report].
3See Donald P. Morgan et al., How Payday Credit Access Affects Overdrafts and Other
Outcomes, 44 J. Money, Credit & Banking 519, 519 (2012).
4See, e.g., John P. Caskey, Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops and
1
for a product so successful with consumers, consumer advocates are almost
uniformly critical of the product.5 Two attributes in particular attract the
most attention. The first is the relatively high interest rates characteristic of
the product, which typically are in the range of 400% (a fixed fee of about
15% for a loan of two weeks or less).6 Concerns about those rates led, for
example, to 2007 legislation7 prohibiting loans to military personnel and
their families at interest rates above 36%; this essentially terminated payday
lending to military families.8
The second concern relates to persistent use of the product. It is well-
the Poor (1996); Doncha Marron, Consumer Credit in the United States: A Sociological
Perspective from the 19th Century to the Present (2009); Robert Mayer, Quick Cash: The
Story of the Loan Shark (2010); David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (2011); Louis
Hyman, Borrow: The American Way of Debt (2012).
5E.g., Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect
Civilians from Payday Lending, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 649 (2012); Nathalie Martin
& Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both Tribal
Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 751 (2012);
Christopher Peterson, Taming the Sharks (2004)
6See, e.g., Hawkins & Mann, supra note 1, at 857. The relatively high nominal interest
rate reflects the cost structure of the industry. On the one hand, operating costs do not
decline proportionately with the size of the loan; thus, the administrative costs for small
loans are quite high when measured on a percentage basis. At the same time, because
the loans are effectively unsecured and typically made with relatively little inquiry into
creditworthiness, losses are not insubstantial. See, e.g., Edward C. Lawrence and Gregory
Elliehausen, A Comparative Analysis of Payday Loan Customers, 26 Contemporary Econ.
Pol’y 299, 301-02 (2008). For a detailed numerical analysis of the operating expenses and
losses of payday lenders and how those compare to fee revenues, see Gregory Elliehausen,
An Analysis of Consumers’ Use of Payday Loans 3-6 (unpublished 2009 manuscript).
7The Talent-Nelson Amendment, Section 670 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, was codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 987.
8See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 663-66 (discussing effects of Talent-Nelson Amend-
ment on lending to military families). For detailed discussion of the implementation of
the amendment, see Patrick M. Aul, Note, Federal Usury Law for Service Members: The
Talent-Nelson Amendment, 12 N.C. Banking Inst. 163 (2008).
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known that many borrowers use the product frequently; in the common
phrasing they are said to “roll over” the loans from pay period to pay period
because they lack the funds to pay them off as they come due. This leads
consumer advocates to fear that borrowers frequently become “mired” in debt
that they could have avoided had they never used the product.9 The specific
concern is that excessive optimism causes users to believe they will pay off
their loans rapidly, when in fact they usually will not.10 Indeed, Bar-Gill and
Warren go so far as to assert that no rational consumer expecting to roll over
the loan would agree to the terms of a payday loan.11
These concerns are at the forefront of current regulatory initiatives at the
state and federal level. At the state level, many states have adopted specific
limitations on rollovers.12 Still others have adopted even stricter regimes,
that effectively ban payday lending at retail locations.13 But the most no-
table activity has come at the federal level, with the recent formation of the
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Two regulatory
9E.g., R. Mayer, supra note 4; C. Peterson, supra note 5; Alan M. White, Behavior
and Contract, 27 J. L. & Inequality 13, 159-63 (2009).
10See Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
44-46 (2008).
11Bar-Gill and Warren, supra note 10, at 44. Alan White’s analysis is similar. See
White, supra note 9, at 159-63.
12See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann and Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. Rev.
855, 897-98 (2006) (discussing structure of common regulatory approaches to rollovers).
13See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, Payday Lending Statutes, avail-
able at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx
(last updated January 18, 2013) (last visited March 7, 2013) (suggesting that 38 states per-
mit payday lending and nine do not); Pew 2012 Report, supra note 2, at 21 (categorizing
state regulatory approaches and suggesting that 15 states have successfully banned retail
payday lending operations). For a detailed summary of recent state regulatory changes,
see Morgan et al., supra note 3, at 529-30.
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innovations are salient. First, the agency has not only the authority long
held by the Federal Trade Commission to respond to unfair and deceptive
practices, but also a new, broader power over “abusive” practices by financial
firms (12 U.S.C. § 5531). In addition to having broader substantive powers,
the CFPB also has sweeping regulatory and supervisory jurisdiction over
bank and nonbank financial service providers that previously did not exist
at the federal or state level.14 Because federal regulators previously had no
direct supervision over the lending practices of nonbanks like the major pay-
day lenders, the new authority of the CFPB raises the possibility of major
new regulatory initiatives in this area.15 Recent CFPB enforcement actions
against major credit card issuers16 suggest it will pursue its mandate vigor-
ously, which makes an accurate perspective on the payday loan a valuable
commodity. Because the CFPB has no authority to regulate interest rates
(12 U.S.C. § 5517(o)), concerns about repetitive use and rollovers are likely
to be at the heart of any such regulatory initiative.17
14The CFPB was created by Title X of Dodd-Frank, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, §§ 1001-1100H. The
regulatory authority directed specifically at nonbank financial service providers appears
in Section 1024 of Dodd-Frank, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514.
15See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 689-726 (detailed discussion of regulatory strategies
available to the CFPB).
16See In re Capital One Bank, (USA) N.A., No. 2012-CFPB-0001 (July 18, 2012)
(consent order); In re American Express Centurion Bank, No. FDIC 12-315b etc. (Sept.
21, 2012) (consent order); In re Discover Bank Greenwood Delaware, No. FDIC-11-548b
etc. (Sept. 24, 2012) (consent order).
17See, e.g., Prepared Remarks by Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau, Consumer Advisory Board Meeting (Washington, D.C., Feb.
20, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-by-
richard-cordray-at-a-consumer-advisory-board-meeting/ (last visited March 5, 2013) (sug-
gesting propriety of CFPB action against products for which “a substantial percentage of
4
In the spirit of Cass Sunstein’s call18 for empirical validation of regulatory
strategies, this study responds to that backdrop with a direct test of the
accuracy of consumer understanding about repetitive use of the product.
Comparing the results from a survey administered to payday loan borrowers
at the time of their loans to subsequent borrowing and repayment behavior,
this essay presents the first direct evidence of the accuracy of payday loan
borrowers’ understanding of the product. In general, the evidence suggests
two things. First, most borrowers do not expect that they will be free of
debt at the end of the first loan term; on the contrary, more than half of
borrowers expect that they will need to continue to borrow for additional pay
cycles. Borrower estimates of an ultimate repayment date are realistic; the
mean predicted period of borrowing after the initial loan matures is 36 days.
Among other things, that finding directly rebuts the idea that borrowers
never understand that they are likely to roll their loans over.
More importantly for present purposes, most (though surely not all) bor-
rowers have a good understanding of their own use of the product. Specifi-
cally, most borrowers finally repay their loans and are free of debt within two
weeks of the date they predicted on the date of the loan. The evidence that
such a large share of borrowers accurately understands how the product will
be used contradicts the accepted premise that substantially all extended use
users rol[l] over their debts on a recurring basis” because those products amount to “debt
traps”).
18Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349 (2011)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation].
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of payday loans is the product of lender misrepresentation or borrower self-
deception about how the product will be used. More broadly, that evidence
contradicts the standard premise of behavioral policy-making, the so-called
“golden rule” of policymaking under which regulatory intervention is appro-
priate only if it can correct a choice that is an error for substantially all of
those who make it.19
Section 2 of the essay situates the survey against prior writing about pay-
day loans. Section 3 describes the survey and resulting dataset. Section 4
describes the results. Section 5 elucidates the implications of the empirical
results for the theoretical and policy debates about payday lending regula-
tion. Section 6 briefly concludes and suggests directions for extension.
2 Literature Review
The focus of this essay is on the particular concern that payday loan bor-
rowers do not understand the product, and specifically that a bias toward
optimism causes them systematically to overestimate the likelihood that they
promptly will be able to free themselves from debt. The idea of an optimism
bias is often attributed to Weinstein’s well-known study of the life expec-
tations of students.20 The basic concept is that individuals systematically
assess their own future opportunities and behavior with undue and excessive
19See Richard R. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 74 (2008).
20Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality
& Soc. Psychology 806 (1980).
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optimism. Buttressed by numerous empirical studies,21 the idea has been
widely accepted as a basic tenet of the behavioral economics literature.22
Among legal academics, concerns about the optimism bias as a cause
of excessive use of payday loans have been pervasive. The claim has been
pressed in passing by several scholars,23 but by far the most prominent and
detailed support for that perspective comes from Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth
Warren. Payday loans are one of the central examples in their work on
“Making Credit Safer.”24 Their strategy with respect to payday loans is to
suggest that borrowers who roll their loans over have underestimated the
risk of nonpayment, reflecting their premise that no rational consumer would
borrow from a payday lender with an expectation to roll over the loan. Thus,
they argue, only the “customer who misestimates her ability to repay the
loan in fourteen days will likely roll the loan over.”25 That perspective is
particularly important because of their role in the creation and design of the
21E.g., Ernest J. Doleys and Guy A. Renzaglia, Accuracy of Student Prediction of
College Grades, 41 Personnel & Guidance J. 528 (1963); Lynn A. Baker and Robert
E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations
of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & Human Behavior 439 (1993); Phanakiran
Radhakrishnan et al., Hoping, Performing, Learning, and Predicting: Changes in the
Accuracy of Self-Evaluations of Performance, 9 Human Performance 23 (1996); Terence
R. Mitchell et al., Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The “Rosy ’View,” ’
33 J. Experimental Soc. Psychology 421 (1997); D.A. Armor and S.E. Taylor, When
Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in Heuristics and Biases: The
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (T. Gilovich et al. eds. 2002).
22E.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
Vand. L. Rev. 1653, 1659-62 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 751, 772-76 (2003); R. Thaler and C. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 33; Tali Sharot,
The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain (2011).
23E.g., C. Peterson, supra note 5, at 165-69; White, supra note 9, at 159-63.
24Bar-Gill and Warren, supra note 10, at 44-46.
25Bar-Gill and Warren, supra note 10, at 44.
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CFPB,26 and because of Warren’s place now in the United States Senate (on
the Senate Banking Committee), where she can be expected to play a key
role in financial regulation.
A similar perspective pervades the more recent work of the Pew Institute’s
Safe Small-Dollar Loans Research Project. Their recent study, based on a
nationally representative survey of payday lending borrowers, finds that most
borrowers do not use the product for short periods of time, but rather are
indebted for about five months out of each year.27 Again, their study works
from the premise that the product is designed for immediate repayment, and
that use in extended borrowing cycles necessarily is problematic. In their own
words, the product’s actual use is in “sharp contrast” to its “advertise[ment]
as short-term, small-dollar credit intended for emergency or special use.”28
Those concerns are even more prominent in the most recent report from the
Pew Project, which emphasizes the premise that borrowers “hold unrealistic
expectations about payday loans.”29
Although the perspective articulated by Bar-Gill, Warren, and Pew has
been taken for granted among legal scholars, its analytical shortcomings are
26For their recommendations for formation of something like the CFPB, see Elizabeth
Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy, Summer 2007; Bar-Gill and Warren, supra note
10.
27See Pew 2012 Report, supra note 2.
28Pew 2012 Report, supra note 2, at 13. The suggestion that the lenders are misrep-
resenting the nature of the product in some way is not unique to the Pew Project. See,
e.g., White, supra note 9, at 159 (suggesting that payday loans “are described (falsely) as
a short-term credit product, exploiting the consumer’s optimism bias”).
29The Pew Institute, Payday Lending in America: How Borrowers Choose and Repay
Payday Loans 19 (2013) [hereinafter Pew 2013 Report].
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apparent. For one thing, as a theoretical matter, it is not at all clear that
optimistic behavior reflects poor financial choices. Thus, such empirical evi-
dence as there is suggests that those who are optimistic in fact make better
financial choices than those who are not.30 Moreover, it is well known that
many consumers do a poor job of managing their lifetime consumption and
savings choices. The typical “prudent” consumer invests too conservatively,
resulting in a substantial shortfall in lifecycle investing; Ayres and Nalebuff
vigorously argue that a more “audacious” pattern of behavior would be ben-
eficial.31 Also, as an empirical matter, it seems far too simple to attribute
misperception of product use to a vague and general bias toward “optimism.”
More recent scholars have emphasized the variety of cognitive limitations
that might lead to arguably ill-advised borrowing. For example, some bor-
rowing might relate to a misprediction of future self-control (such as a failure
to appreciate the likely effects of hyperbolic discounting), a classic example
of the optimism bias.32 Others recently have emphasized the possibility that
scarcity creates a cognitive “load” that might force inattention to the costs
of future borrowing.33 Still again, some of the borrowing is likely to relate to
30See Manju Puri and David T. Robinson, Optimism and Economic Choice, 86 J. Fin.
Econ. 71, 87-90 (2007). Indeed, Puri and Robinson document a broad range of choices
in which optimism produces superior life outcomes; more optimistic people are likely to
work harder, retire later, remarry, and the like. See id. at 84-87.
31See Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious
Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement Portfolio (2010).
32See Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Dis-
counting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default 3 (unpublished 2008
manuscript).
33See Anuj K. Shah et al., Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 Science 682
(2012).
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a misprediction of the income and consumption shocks necessary for repay-
ment to occur.34 Thus, absent a research design that can distinguish among
those causes, even empirical evidence that borrowers mispredict their use of
the product well might reflect any number of problems more or less closely
related to excessive optimism.
Against that background, it is distressing that those who seem so sure
that all payday loan borrowers are making incorrect choices have failed to ob-
serve either the theoretical or empirical ambiguity that plagues their claims.
Indeed, legal scholars writing about the role of optimism bias in consumer
lending have not for the most part offered empirical evidence; rather they
have imported the findings of the behavioral economists and psychologists
into this context, using the possibility of optimism bias to explain increases
in consumer borrowing.35 Hence, empirical work about the prevalence and
significance of optimism among payday loan borrowers has come from other
venues. An important paper by Bertrand and Morse36 tests the effectiveness
of various disclosure forms in altering perceptions about how the product
will work. Bertrand and Morse also surveyed borrowers about how long they
34See Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial Services for
Low- and Middle-Income Communities, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 729, 744-47 (2012)
(emphasizing that problem)..
35See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. Rev.
127, 132-38; Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249,
252 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing]; Nathalie Martin and
Ocean Tama y Sweet, Mind Games: Rethinking BAPCPA’s Debtor Education Provisions,
31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 517, 531-33 (2006); Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the
Virtues of Negotiability in the Wake of Enron, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 83, 103 (2007).
36Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and
Payday Borrowing, 66 J. Fin. 1865 (2011).
10
believed payday loans typically remain outstanding; about half the borrow-
ers in their study thought that loans typically remain outstanding beyond
the base two-week period. A recent survey by researchers at the Center for
Financial Services Innovation asked a sample of borrowers using a variety of
alternative financial services, after the fact, if it “took more time than ex-
pected to repay the loan.” Of the payday loan borrowers, only 32% reported
that it did take longer than expected.37 Similarly, the 2013 report from the
Pew Project addresses this question obliquely, finding on the one hand that
the overwhelming majority of borrowers report the terms of the transactions
as clear but at the same time report that they do not have funds in their
monthly budget to repay the loan in one cycle.38
Collectively, those studies suggest that payday lending borrowers under-
stand that many borrowers roll over their loans, and that this understanding
is, at the most general level, accurate. Neither study, however, sheds any
light on the central factual question: how well do individual borrowers un-
derstand their own likely future behavior? If optimism in fact is driving these
decisions, then borrowers systematically are likely to underestimate the time
to repayment. That is the question that motivated this study.
37Rob Levy and Joshua Sledge, A Complex Portrait: An Examination of Small-Dollar
Credit Consumers 21 (unpublished 2012 manuscript).
38See Pew 2013 Report, supra note 29, at 13-17.
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3 Data and Methods
3.1 The Survey
3.1.1 Survey Design
Because the survey instrument was to be administered to borrowers at the
point of borrowing, the interest in obtaining a high response rate suggested
that it should be concise, limited to one side of a single sheet of paper. Lim-
ited by that constraint, the instrument inquires about borrower characteris-
tics, use of the borrowed funds, and borrower expectations about repayment.
The questions eliciting background data mirror similar questions exam-
ined in the existing literature,39 and help to establish a baseline of the charac-
teristics of the payday loan borrowers in the sample. The instrument collects
information about race, age, gender, education, and prior experience with
payday lenders.
On the second topic, the instrument offers thirteen specific uses. Borrow-
ers can check as many as apply or add text into a catchall into which borrow-
ers can add written comments; that question tracks precisely the question
asked on that topic in Bertrand and Morse’s paper,40 with the addition of
an option for education expenses.
The focal point of the survey is assessing the quality of borrower under-
39See, e.g., Lawrence & Elliehausen, supra note 6, at 305-08; Elliehausen, supra note 6,
at 27-29; Michael S. Barr, No Slack: The Financial Lives of Low-Income Americans 148
(2012).
40Bertrand & Morse, supra note 36, at 1870.
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standing of how the product will be used. Initially, the object was to take the
topic of Bertrand and Morse’s paper41 and test the accuracy of perception,
by comparing the borrower’s expectation to actual subsequent borrowing and
repayment behavior. As it turned out, however, it was far more complicated
than expected to modify the Bertrand and Morse survey question for this
project.
The Bertrand and Morse survey included the following question: “What’s
your best guess of how long it takes the average person to pay back in full
a $300 payday loan? Please answer in weeks.”42 In modifying that question
for use in this survey, several issues arose, which ultimately led to three
separate questions on this topic. The biggest problem relates to the inherent
ambiguity of what it means in this context to pay a loan “back in full.” As
it happens, the law of many states (including the five states in which the
survey was given) technically forbids “rollover” loans.43 Still, it is possible
in most states (including all of the survey states other than Florida) for the
lender to conduct same-day transactions in which a new loan is issued on
the same day as the loan being paid off. Although the difference between a
rollover (collecting a new fee and extending the term of the existing loan)
and issuing a new loan shortly after repayment of the old loan might seem
technical, it complicates the survey process considerably. For one thing,
41Bertrand & Morse, supra note 36.
42Bertrand & Morse, supra note 36, at 1876.
43Cal. Fin. Code § 23037(a); Fla. Stat. § 560.404(19) (requiring 24-hour cooling-off
period between loans); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16a-2-404(6); La. Rev. Stat. § 9:3578.6(7)
(permitting rollovers only upon partial prepayment); 59 Okla. Stat. § 3109(A).
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excluding borrowers who default on the first loan (and there were no such
borrowers in this dataset), all borrowers in fact pay the loan back in full at
the conclusion of the first pay period.44 Thus, if I had used the Bertrand and
Morse question without revision (asking how many weeks it would take for
a loan to be paid “back in full”), all borrowers who understood the product
and answered truthfully would have responded with an answer indicating
the original date of maturity (in this dataset typically something less than
14 days). Yet, if the question is designed to test perceptions about rollovers,
such answers would indicate ignorance of the likelihood that many if not
most of the borrowers would take out a new loan shortly after repayment of
the original loan. Because of the difficulty of separating the responses that
might reflect a literal reading of the question from those that might reflect a
colloquial reading of the question, I decided to phrase the question differently.
Trying to ask a question that could be answered with literal accuracy in
an informative way, I revised the Bertrand and Morse question and divided it
into two separate questions. The first asks about the borrower’s anticipation
of whether the survey loan will be rolled over: “Do you expect to continue
this borrowing after the due date of this loan?” Paired with that question is a
followup about the extent of likely rollovers, roughly parallel to the Bertrand
and Morse estimate: “If so, for how many additional weeks?” To be sure, this
question is more complex than the Bertrand and Morse question, and thus
44It is apparent, in accordance with applicable local law, that none of the loans in this
dataset were rolled over at their original date of maturity.
14
poses a risk that subjects will not understand what the question is asking, but
ultimately I decided that the virtue of precision justified the more complex
phrasing.
A second problem relates to a mismatch between rollovers as the prob-
lematic aspect of the product and borrowers being mired in a long-term debt
relationship as the ultimate policy concern.45 Even if we extend the con-
cept of rollovers to include substantially contemporaneous new borrowings
(the subject of the revised question discussed above), we have missed much
of what makes the pattern of payday borrowing troubling. In truth, even
if a borrower does not roll a loan over, but instead repays the loan out of
incoming salary, the borrower has not become free from the cycle of payday
borrowing until the borrower goes an entire pay cycle without a new loan.46
Thus, the proper topic of inquiry is the length of the borrowing cycle – start-
ing from the initial loan, how much time elapses before the borrower is free
from debt in the sense of going an entire pay period without a new loan.47
The final question of the survey attempts to gauge expectations about that
broader notion of repayment: “We’d like to understand more about your
overall financial picture. How long do you think it will be before you have
saved enough money to go an entire pay period without borrowing from this
45E.g. D. Graeber, supra note 4; L. Hyman, supra note 4.
46For a detailed discussion of that problem and the weakness of typical state regulatory
responses, see Mann and Hawkins, supra note 1, at 898.
47For a similar technique constructing the “spell” of an individual’s borrowing, see Marc
Anthony Fusaro and Patricia J. Cirillo, Do Payday Loans Trap Consumers in a Cycle of
Debt (unpublished 2011 manuscript).
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lender? If you aren’t sure, please give your best estimate.”
3.1.2 Survey Administration
With the cooperation of a large national payday lender, the survey instru-
ment was administered to borrowers at payday lending stores in a group of
five states during the summer of 2012; the goal was for administration to
continue at each store until the total number of surveys had reached approx-
imately 1200. The survey was presented to every other eligible borrower. To
ensure that the borrower was not in the middle of a borrowing cycle, borrow-
ers who had borrowed during the preceding 30 days were not eligible. Aside
from that exclusion, all borrowers approved for loans were eligible. The rea-
son for presenting the survey only to alternate borrowers was to limit the
possibility that potential borrowers would come to the store for the purpose
of receiving the modest survey compensation ($10). In the end, the survey
was presented to 1374 borrowers. The response rate was quite high; only 48
refused, for a response rate of 96.5%.48 Table 1 summarizes the distribution
of the surveys and store locations among the five states.
3.2 Lender Data
Because the purpose of the project was to assess the accuracy of borrower
expectations about the product, it was crucial to obtain data about the
48Unfortunately, I did not receive loan numbers for the 48 borrowers who refused the
survey. As a result, I cannot compare the borrowing characteristics of those borrowers
who refused the survey to the borrowing characteristics of those that completed it.
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State Locations Surveys
California 24 374
Florida 14 447
Kansas 4 86
Louisiana 11 359
Oklahoma 5 60
Total 58 1326
Table 1: Summary of Survey and Store Distribution
actual borrowing and repayment practices of the survey subjects. The lender
provided access to complete data about all borrowers for a period of twelve
months. Access to this type of data is crucial, because it makes it possible
to study the actual patterns of borrowing and repayment at the individual
level. For this particular project, it allowed me to examine two aspects of the
behavior of payday borrowers that has not previously been studied. First, as
discussed above, it allowed me to calculate the actual borrowing cycles for
each borrower – I was able to determine for each borrower who answered a
survey how long from the date of the contemporaneous loan elapsed before
the borrower went an entire pay period without borrowing. Second, because
the survey displays the borrower’s expectations about repayment behavior,
I was able to compare the borrower’s expected repayment behavior to what
actually transpired.
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4 Results
The most important results of the survey relate to the central questions that
motivated the project; three topics warrant detailed discussion. First, most
borrowers expected that they would continue borrowing for some time after
the initial loan. This undermines the notion (characteristic of much of the
legal literature on the subject) that the repeated borrowing that is typical
of payday borrowers generally reflects surprise on the part of the borrowers
or deception on the part of the lenders. Second, the borrower’s predictions
about their future repayment behavior, although imperfect, are surprisingly
accurate. On the principal question – when would the borrower be free from
borrowing for an entire pay period – about 60% of the borrowers predicted
the final repayment date with reasonable accuracy (within a 14-day window,
as discussed below). That is to say, most borrowers could predict to within
one pay period when they would be free of debt. Third, most surprisingly, the
demographic characteristics do little to differentiate borrowers in explaining
the accuracy of predictions. The strongest and most consistently significant
predictor of accuracy are heavy prior use of the product, which relates sub-
stantially to poor predictions, and the nature of state regulation, which leads
to substantial variation in the quality of predictions (presumably because of
differences in the pool of borrowers).
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4.1 Borrower Characteristics
Before turning to the substantive results, a few words about the character-
istics of the borrowing population are warranted. Figure 1 summarizes the
distribution by race, gender, age, and educational attainment. As the figure
indicates, payday loan borrowers are less likely to be white (less than 25%)
and more likely to be black (about 50%) than the general population, more
likely to be female (about 60%), likely to be relatively young (the modal
group is aged 25-34), and likely to be relatively educated (more than half
have attended college).49 In general, those characteristics are consistent with
the findings of prior academics that have collected similar information about
payday lending customers.50
The data about the uses to which the funds are put are also, broadly
speaking, similar to prior survey results asking about similar topics. In gen-
eral, they show that the dominant use (about two-thirds of all borrowers) is
for ordinary recurring expenditures (rent, utilities, groceries, or the like). A
much smaller share (about 10%) respond to emergencies, and an even smaller
share (less than 5%) are for leisure expenditures (gifts, dining, and the like).
51
49There is a substantial group that reports attending college, but that has not achieved
a B.A. degree or the equivalent. This is in part due to the young age of that portion of
the sample and the concomitant likelihood that their postsecondary education is ongoing.
50See supra note 39 (summarizing prior similar data collections).
51About 17% report uses in multiple categories. For comparison, the similar figures from
the Pew Project’s survey appear in Pew 2012 Report, supra note 2, at 14. Having said
that, it does seem likely that the Pew sample involves a considerably less creditworthy
group of borrowers than the sample analyzed here. See Pew 2013 Report, supra note
29, at 33 (discussing overdraft rates in the Pew sample). This most likely relates to the
19
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pe
rc
en
t
White Black Hisp AsianNative Am.Mixed
Race
0
20
40
60
Pe
rc
en
t
Male Female
Gender
0
5
10
15
20
25
Pe
rc
en
t
<25 25−34 35−44 45−54 55−64 >64
Age
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
en
t
<HS HS College BA+
Education
Figure 1: Demographic Characteristics of Borrowers. Histograms display
distribution of demographic characteristics based on survey responses of bor-
rowers. N=1318-1324.
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Figure 2: Planned Uses of Borrowed Funds. N=1069. Histograms based only
on responsive surveys.
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4.2 Ex Ante Understanding of Continued Use
The most straightforward information to come from this survey involves the
expectations of payday lending borrowers about the expected length of their
borrowing. As summarized above, the survey asked a series of closely related
questions on that topic. However the question was phrased, a large group
of borrowers expected, at the time of their loans, that they would be using
the product continuously for a considerable time. So, for example, when
asked whether they would “continue” their borrowing after its original due
date – essentially whether they anticipated rolling over their loans – 40%
(n=518) thought that they would and another 2% (n=19) wrote in an answer
indicating in one way or another that they couldn’t be sure (“don’t know”
“idk” “maybe” “not sure” etc.).52
What is most notable, however, is the variability of expectations about
how long the borrowing would continue (the followup question to the question
whether the borrowing was expected to continue). As the first panel of Figure
3 displays, among the borrowers who offered an estimation as to when they
inclusion in the Pew sample of a large number of online customers. See Pew 2013 Report,
supra note 29, at 55 (Pew sample includes 451 storefront customers and 252 internet
customers). Because those lenders are not readily supervised by state regulators, there is a
strong likelihood of more abusive lending and collection practices, and considerable reason
to think that the borrowing pool is less creditworthy. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
Major Banks Aid in Payday Loans Banned by States, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2013, available
at www.nytimes.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2013); see also Pew 2013 Report, supra note 29,
at 16 (reporting that more than twice as money online customers think terms are unclear
as storefront customers).
52That answer resonates with the concerns emphasized in Mann, supra note 34, at
744-47, about the inherent unpredictability of a solution to the financial problems of the
desperate.
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would repay their debt,53 a substantial group (more than half) expected that
it would take more than 20 days, which is to say, that they expected that
the borrowing would continue for more than two weeks beyond the due date
of the original loan. To put it another way, a majority of the respondents to
that question contemplated at least three consecutive loans.
Because of the practical ambiguity about what it means to “continue”
borrowing in a system in which rolling over a loan is formally unlawful (and
thus something that apparently does not happen in any of the stores covered
by the survey), the broader question about when the borrower expected to be
debt free for an entire pay period seems considerably more instructive about
the reality of borrower expectations. The data also suggest some reason to
believe that the question made more sense to the borrowers, because they re-
sponded to it much more readily: only two-thirds (340/518) of the borrowers
who said they would “continue” borrowing responded to the question “how
long,” but 80% of the borrowers (n=1072) who answered surveys responded
with a numeric answer to the question how long it would take for them to
be clear of debt.
The second panel of Figure 3 summarizes the results for that question.
53For a variety of reasons, the number of respondents providing a numerical response
to that question was relatively small (n=340). For one thing, the instrument sought a
response only from those that expected to “continue” their borrowing after the initial loan
(a little less than half of the respondents). Furthermore, even among the group who did
indicate they expected to continue, a substantial group of respondents (about a third) did
not answer the question. Finally, as noted above, a number of respondents (about 20)
responded with written text indicating in one way or another that they could not be sure
when the borrowing would end.
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Figure 3: Expected Borrowing Patterns. First panel (n=340) depicts the
number of days the borrower expected the borrowing to continue beyond the
original due date; second panel (n=1072) depicts the predicted number of
days from loan date to date when borrower expects to be free from debt for
an entire pay period. Histograms based on numerical responses only.
24
The responses suggest a relatively long period of expected borrowing. Thus,
looking only to the numerical responses, fully half of all borrowers expected
to remain in debt three weeks or more; the mean response was 36 days. Be-
cause this question was asked of all borrowers (not only those who expected
to continue in debt past the period of the original loan), it indicates yet
again, using this somewhat different metric, that most of the borrowers ex-
pected that they would borrow again after the initial period of debt. What
is most striking is the long right tail of the distribution. Fully ten percent of
respondents expected to remain in debt 70 days and 5% to remain in debt
more than 110 days.
4.3 Predicting Freedom from Debt
The survey responses discussed in the preceding section are not unique. Al-
though the questions are modified somewhat (as discussed above), they are
in substance similar to the questions Bertrand and Morse asked about the
borrower’s understanding of typical product use. What is novel about this
data structure, however, is the ability to match those predictions to the ac-
tual behavior of the borrowers, which allows a direct test of the extent to
which excessive optimism about future behavior relates to borrower use of
the product. It is also important that this study examines the cycle of re-
payment, rather than the narrower question of rollovers. By examining the
entire cycle, I get a much more extended (and realistic) understanding of the
continuing indebtedness related to a single loan.
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There is, to be sure, a glass half-empty/half-full quality to assessment
of the responses. As with the effects of the disclosures that Bertrand and
Morse discuss,54 assessments of borrower psychology depend directly on a
baseline intuition about “typical” or “normal” psychology. So, in this case, an
assessment of whether the borrower’s predictions are “surprisingly” accurate,
inaccurate, optimistic, or pessimistic depends directly on a baseline about
how accurate such predictions reasonably could be expected to be.
As it turns out, the difference between the outcomes and predictions is
quite varied, with a considerable number of borrowers becoming clear from
debt earlier than expected and a considerable number becoming clear from
debt later than expected. Given the rough quality of the predictions (which
the survey instrument requests in weeks), it makes little sense in evaluat-
ing the predictions to ask whether the debt was repaid on the precise date
predicted. Thus, in making a rough judge of the quality of the predictions,
it seems sensible to provide for a window on either side of the precise date.
Because the lending cycle for these borrowers is the pay period, and because
the overwhelming majority of the borrowers appear to have a two-week pay
cycle, I ultimately decided to analyze whether the prediction of the date on
which the borrower will be clear of debt falls within two weeks of the actual
date on which the borrower turns out to become clear of debt.55 From that
54See Bertrand & Morse, supra note 36, at 1889-90.
55For purposes of these calculations, this is the number of days from the date of the
surveyed advance to the date the borrower repays a loan and has no new borrowings for a
period that exceeds fourteen days. For purposes of these calculations, the five borrowers
who defaulted on their loans without making payment are treated as late.
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Window of Predictions % On-Time
7 Days 51%
14 Days 57%
21 Days 63%
Table 2: Accuracy of Predictions of Payday Borrowers. N=1072.
perspective, Table 2 summarizes the central findings of the essay. As the
Table indicates, almost 60% of respondents managed to become free of debt
either before or within two weeks of their predicted date of clearance. To
test the robustness of that estimate, I made parallel calculations using 7-day
and 21-day windows. Those produced results that bracketed the 57% figure
for the 14-day window: 51% for the 7-day window and 63% for the 21-day
window. To put it conversely, only 43% failed to clear themselves from debt
within two weeks of their predicted date and less than half were late by more
than a week. That is, of course, not an insignificant share, but it does suggest
that a strong majority of those using the product have a basic understanding
of what will happen when they borrow.
4.4 The Role of Demography and Experience
Although the findings summarized in the previous section suggest that the
quality of borrower predictions is reasonably good, it is important to con-
sider the possibility that the quality of predictions relates substantially to
race, gender, age, or education. If it were clear, for example, that borrower
predictions were systematically less accurate for low-income, elderly, or mi-
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nority populations, those findings would be considerably less reassuring than
they seem at first glance. Figure 4 is a dotplot that summarizes the results
of a logistic regression model assessing those relationships.56 The dependent
variable is whether the particular borrower was more than 14 days late in
becoming clear from debt, as compared to the borrower’s prediction in the
survey instrument. The model includes explanatory variables for the bor-
rower’s race, gender, age, education, state of residence, and prior experience
with the product. The reference borrower is a white male 25-34 years old
residing in California with a college education and some prior experience
(reporting 1-10 prior transactions) with payday lending.57
Because the dataset is relatively small, there may be relatively small ef-
fects undetected here, but in general the regressions largely exclude the pos-
sibility that demographic characteristics of the borrowers have a substantial
effect on the accuracy of borrower predictions. For example, with respect to
56The dotplot (or nomogram) shows the estimated coefficient, represented by the dot,
and 95% confidence intervals, represented by the bars. Visually, the nomogram is prefere-
ble to a tabular presentation because it is easier to compare the relative size and direction
of the coefficients, while allowing statistical significance to be inferred from the ends of
the confidence intervals. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., Let’s Practice What We Preach:
Turning Tables into Graphs, 56 Amer. Statistician 121, 121-29 (2002); Lee Epstein et al.,
On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 Vand.
L. Rev. 799, 836-37 (2007); see also Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication
of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1811, 1827-35 (2006) (dis-
cussing deficiencies of the commonly used tabular display of coefficients and confidence
intervals).
57I investigated the possibility that those effects related to the purpose for which the
borrower obtained the initial advance, but found no significant relationships (either for
individual purposes or for a variety of aggregated groups of purposes). That well might
relate to the relatively small number of borrowers that sought loans for the various purposes
included on the survey.
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Figure 4: Nomogram Predicting Results from Logistic Regression Analysis
of the Effects of Geography, Demography, and Experience, on Predicting
Product Usage. N=1041. Panels depict coefficients with 95% confidence
intervals for logit regression model estimating the relation between listed
borrower characteristics and the likelihood that the borrower’s predicted date
of debt clearance will be more than 14 days late. The reference borrower is
a white male 25-34 years old residing in California with a college education
and some prior experience with payday lending. Although the effects are
nonlinear, textual interpretation of the coefficients uses the “divide by 4 rule,”
which approximates the effects at the steepest point of the logistic curve.
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race, all of the race variables included in the model have positive coefficients,
suggesting a greater likelihood of unexpectedly late payment for nonwhite
respondents than for white respondents, but none of the coefficients is signif-
icant even at the 10% level. Similarly, gender appears to be wholly irrelevant.
Age produces a substantial result only for the 55-64 year old group, who ap-
pear to be about 11 percentage points more likely to have underestimated the
repayment period than 25-34 year olds; against a mean of 37%, that reflects
an increased likelihood of late payment of about 30%.
At the same time, geography (presumably at least in part a proxy for
differences in the local legal regime) does appear to play a substantial role.
Borrowers in Florida are about 12 percentage points less likely to pay later
than expected (as compared to California borrowers), where borrowers in
Kansas are about 25 percentage points more likely to pay later than expected.
The small sample from Oklahoma suggests a likelihood of later-than-expected
payment elevated by 15 percentage points, significant only at the 10% level.
Although the small group of states in which the survey was administered
makes it difficult to interpret those results, it is instructive to look briefly at
the differing regulatory regimes in the five survey states to consider potential
explanations.
Interestingly, the most constraining regulatory system among the survey
states matches up with the outlier on predictive accuracy. Florida’s regime
is on each of the dimensions summaried in the table the most restrictive:
the lowest interest rate, the only defined cooling-off period, and database-
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State Highest
Lawful Fee
(per $100)
Rollover
Constraints
Multiple Lender/Database
Constraints
California $15 Direct rollovers
prohibited
None
Florida $10 24-hour cooling
off period
24-hour cooling off period
applies to all lenders;
database verification
required
Kansas $15 Direct rollovers
prohibited
None
Louisiana $16.75 Permitted with
$25 partial
payment
None
Oklahoma $15 Direct rollovers
prohibited
No more than two loans
(from all lenders) permitted
at any time; database
verification required
Table 3: Regulatory Regimes in Survey States. Sources: Cal. Fin. Code §§
23036(a) & (c), 23037(a); Fla. Stat. § 560.404(6), (18) & (19); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 16a-2-404(1)(c) & (6); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 9:3578.4, .6(7); 59 Okla.
Stat. §§ 3108, 3109(A), (B).
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verified limitation to one loan. At the same time, as Figure 4 illustrates,
Florida borrowers are substantially more accurate than the norm in this data.
The most likely explanation is that the Florida borrowers are systemically
less risky because the low-interest rate cap and other features of the Florida
statute58 limits Florida stores to a more financially stable group of borrowers
than the regulatory regimes in the other states.59
Finally, prior experience with the product has a marked effect, with heavy
users (those self-reporting more than 10 prior payday loans)60 being more
than 11 percentage points more likely to pay late. This suggests a direction
for the relation between product usage and understanding: it is not that
58Among other things, the Florida statute also includes a 24-hour cooling-off period
enforced by a database enforcement scheme that is more rigorous than in any of the other
surveyed states.
59It is difficult to tell whether this result is better, or worse, than the results in other
States, because it obviously reflects a constraint of credit to the customers to whom it
would be profitable to lend under the regulatory regimes of other States. Moreover, it
seems quite likely that at least some portion of the relatively less creditworthy borrowers
to whom it is unprofitable to extend loans under Florida’s regime are resorting to online
lenders (whom Florida’s regulatory system cannot, practicably, control). The Pew Project
does suggest that stronger regulatory regimes do not result in an increased level of online
borrowing, see Pew 2012 Report, supra note 2, at 5, 22, but the amount of data on which
that conclusion is based makes it difficult to accept at face value. Among other things, it
is plain that the number of borrowers from any particular state is quite small (there are
only 451 borrowers in the nationwide sample for the 2012 report, see Pew 2012 Report,
supra, at 32), which makes it impractical to conduct separate statistical analysis on a
state-by-state basis of likely predictors of payday borrowing. Thus, the finding that online
borrowing is no higher in aggressive regulatory regimes than in lax regulatory regimes
well might relate to the demand for borrowing in the aggressively regulated states (with
a relatively low demand for this kind of borrowing relating both to the tolerability of an
aggressive regulatory regime and the limited demand for online borrowing).
60The survey excludes borrowers who had a loan in the immediately preceding thirty
days. The question about prior usage was designed to explore lifetime experience with the
product, rather than short-term financial stability. I note that by excluding a group of
possibly heavy users that feature of the data collection likely results in a less experienced,
but possibly more creditworthy, sample.
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understanding of the product comes from prior use. Rather, it is that heavy
users of the product tend to be those that understand least what is likely
to happen to them. Related to that point, it appears that those who pre-
dict long borrowing periods are those most likely to err substantially in their
predictions.61 Specifically, the likelihood of unexpectedly late payment in-
creases substantially with the length of the borrower’s prediction. This does
not necessarily mean that heavy users are those that understand the product
the least; it may simply indicate that they are the individuals who are in the
most serious financial distress, for whom freedom from debt is most difficult
to predict.62 In either event, however, it suggests that prior experience with
the product is not an important indicator of improved understanding.
5 Implications
Like the findings Bertrand and Morse report,63 the findings reported here
cut in two directions. On the one hand, they suggest that a substantial
share of payday lending is rational, in the sense that the borrowers generally
understand the outcome of product use at the time they receive an advance
of funds. It is not easy, as they note, to develop policy proposals based on
data that suggest that large groups of borrowers use the product with an
61A T-test suggests that the difference between the likelihood of error for the quartile of
borrowers with the shortest predicted borrowing cycle and the likelihood of error for the
quartile of borrowers with the highest predicted borrowing cycle is significant at the 1%
level.
62I emphasize the likely prevalence of that problem in Mann, supra note 34, at 744-47.
63See Bertrand & Morse, supra note 36, at 1889-90.
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understanding of their future behavior.
Still, the findings are provocative against the backdrop of the under-
standing of the product that dominates legal and policymaking circles. As
suggested above, the basic premise of the regulatory community to date (as
reflected in the work of Bar-Gill, Warren, and the Pew Project64) is that
all uses of the product that lead to a cycle of borrowing are problematic –
either because they rest on a prior misunderstanding of the product or, more
seriously, because they demonstrate deceit by the lender. That premise,
if true, implicitly supports a substantial prohibitory intervention related to
the rollover feature of payday loans, at least under the standard behavioral
economics theory of regulation. Although behavioral-based regulatory theo-
rists generally suggest that regulators should aim strongly toward a “nudge,”
and should avoid prohibitory regulation, they do recognize the propriety of
prohibitory paternalistic intervention that aids an overwhelming majority of
borrowers – “asymmetric” paternalism in the terminology of its most sophis-
ticated advocates.65 If it were true, then, that an overwhelming majority
(or all) payday lending borrowers who roll over their loans do so because of
misperception, then prohibitory intervention would make sense.
64See most notably Bar-Gill and Warren, supra note 10, at 44; Pew 2012 Report, supra
note 2, at 13; Pew 2013 Report, supra note 29, at 19.
65See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (2002) (comprehen-
sive analysis of that strategy); see also R. Thaler and C. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 74
(brief discussion of regulatory “golden” rule.. See generally Sunstein, Boundedly Rational
Borrowing, supra note 35, at 256-60 (general summary of scholarship on asymmetric and
“weak” paternalism).
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The findings summarized above, however, contradict that argument at
its first step. Specifically, they document a set of borrowers, most of whom
accurately understand, when they first borrow, how long it will take them to
get free of their debt. More generally, those findings are in tension not only
with the specific application of the optimism bias idea to payday lending but
with the generally quick acceptance, without empirical investigation, of the
idea that substantially all of the financial behavior of the less sophisticated
are plagued by such misperceptions. That finding has two direct implications
for regulatory design. First, it strongly undermines the likely efficacy of even
a relatively forceful “nudge,” the kind of “sticky default” that Michael Barr
and Sendhil Mullainathan have advocated for mortgage regulation.66
Second, it starkly undermines the conventional case for modern pro-
hibitory behavioral regulation. As summarized above,67 the “golden rule”
of regulation sought by the leading school of behaviorally influenced policy-
makers rests on the empirical premise that substantially all of the affected
population would make the choice sought by the regulator (in this case, not
to roll over the loan, or not to enter into it if roll over seemed likely). The
empirical assumptions of Bar-Gill, Warren and others play directly into that
66See Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in New Per-
spective on Regulation 27, 43-48 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds. 2009). Mullainathan
is now the Assistant Director for Research at the CFPB, and it is reasonable to think his
views influenced the CFPB’s recently promulgated comprehensive reform of mortgage dis-
closure regulation. See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, High-Cost Mortgage
and Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z)
and Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (Regulation X); Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 6856 (2013).
67See supra note 65
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regulatory framework. But without those empirical assumptions, the case
for a “golden” exercise of asymmetric paternalism is simply not available.
To be sure, at first glance there might seem some cause of concern for
the 40% of borrowers who do not accurately foresee their use of the product.
The natural question, however, is what share of borrowers could predict their
future use of any modern financial product. Because scholars have not con-
ducted similar surveys for other competing financial products, it is difficult
to compare the approximately 60% share of payday lending borrowers who
have a reasonably accurate perception of how they will use the product with
the shares that could make similarly accurate predictions about other finan-
cial products. Still, many products might fare much worse on that metric. Is
it fair to expect, for example, that 60% of those who borrow on a credit card
could predict within two weeks the date on which they would finally repay
all outstanding debt on the card?68 It would make little sence for regulatory
intervention based on misperception to shift borrowers to other products that
are plagued by higher rates of misperception than payday loans.
The closest recent information on this subject comes from Levy and
Sledge’s study,69 which asks users of a variety of alternative financial services
whether it took them longer than expected to repay the loan.70 Their results
68See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in
Consumer Markets 89-90 (2012).
69Levy & Sledge, supra note 37.
70See Levy & Sledge, supra note 37, at 21. Because Levy and Sledge inquired about
product use retrospectively – asking borrowers about their past use – it is possible that
their results overstate the accuracy of borrowing expectations: we might expect borrowers
after the fact to remember their performance as having been better than it actually was.
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suggest that payday loans are not an outlier with respect to predictability of
repayment: they found that 32% of payday lending borrowers reported tak-
ing longer than expected to repay their loans, as compared to 32% of auto
title loans, 29% of pawn loan borrowers, and 20% of bank deposit advance
borrowers.71
The obvious implications, then, are that the strongest case for direct reg-
ulation of payday rollovers is a direct exercise of paternalism, based not on
the idea that informed customers would choose not to borrow when roll over
seems likely, but rather on the regulatory conclusion that borrowers should
not be allowed to have those loans even if they understand their consequences.
Although this regulatory approach often is appealing to policymaking think
tanks,72 it is much less likely to find favor with the more mainstream aca-
demic regulatory analysts. Thus, for example, Cass Sunstein has directly
disavowed the propriety of this kind of regulation.73 In this context, at least,
with such a limited empirical understanding of either the factors that lead
to such a high demand for high-cost credit or the factors that make other
Still, because they used a similar methodology for several products, their results provide
a useful benchmark for comparing the role of misperception for different products.
71Levy & Sledge, supra note 37, at 21.
72The 2013 Pew Report takes this tack directly. On the one hand, their survey results
resonate strongly with the findings discussed above – they report that 88% of storefront
customers say the terms of lending are clear. Pew 2013 Report, supra note 29, at 16.
73See Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, supra note 35 (justifying “a firm pre-
sumption against strong paternalism” in the context of borrowing regulation). The detailed
summary of regulatory strategies published after his stint in the Obama Administration
does not even consider the possible propriety of this type of regulation. Cass R. Sunstein,
Empirically Informed Regulation, supra note 18.
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credit alternatives seem so much more expensive to the customers,74 the quick
choice of prohibitory regulation seems more like a palliative cop-out than a
bold reform. In truth, what is needed is a better understanding of the finan-
cial problems of the increasing number of low- and middle-income households
in our economy, coupled with a frank assessment about the problems with
the social safety net that lead to the desperate demand for short-term credit
that the Pew Project documents.75
6 Conclusion
Payday loans are a fascinating topos for the regulatory analyst. Reviled for
abusiveness by middle- and upper-class academics,76 the product remains in-
tensely attractive to those for who it is designed. Thus, looking forward from
the immediate regulatory possibilities discussed above, the findings suggest
a wide variety of possibilities for further research. The most obvious possi-
bility would be to probe the rationality of the borrowing decision in the first
place. As discussed above, much literature has assumed that the decision
to borrow expecting rollovers cannot be rational. If the data presented here
suggest that most borrowers are making that choice consciously, it suggests
the value of further inquiry into the longer-run status of balance-sheet dete-
rioration of payday lending borrowers. Here, the suggestion of Agarwal and
74See Mann, supra note 34, at 741-44 (discussing that problem).
75See Mann, supra note 34, at 747-50 (making that point at length).
76See Mann, supra note 34, at 739-40 (suggesting a link between the penchant for
paternalistic intervention and the social class of those that seek it).
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his co-authors77 that payday loan borrowing often reflects a long-term loss
of liquidity from other sources such as credit cards, well might show the way
to a broader understanding of the relevant balance-sheet problems.
Extending the work in a different direction, broader surveys of payday
lending borrowers could explore the geographic variation identified above,
with a view to identifying any relation between the share of misperceiving
borrowers and the rigor (or laxity) of state regulation. Extension of the
survey to online lenders (who have a much more aggressive business model)78
could explore the likelihood that the users of online loans are more likely to
suffer from misperception. And more ambitiously, similar surveys of users of
other financial products could document the relative accuracy of borrower
understandings of those products. To the extent those products use different
regulatory and disclosure regimes the comparative results might foster an
understanding of the value (or futility)79 of those regimes. Similarly, to the
extent that behavioral regulatory interventions more broadly are premised on
misperception, such studies would help to focus interventions on the products
where misperceptions are most pervasive.
77Sumit Agarwal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit
Scoring Puzzles, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 412 (2009).
78See supra note 51.
79See Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647 (2010).
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